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Abstract
In order to bolster the public mental health safety net, we must first understand how these systems
function on a day-to-day basis. This study explored how individual attributes and organizational
interdependencies within one predominantly urban US county affected responses to individuals’
needs during psychiatric crises. We interviewed clinicians and managers within the crisis response
network about people at immediate risk of psychiatric hospitalization, what had happened to them
during their crises, and factors affecting services provided (N = 94 individuals and 9 agencies).
Social network diagrams depicted patterns of referrals between agencies. Iterative coding of
interview transcripts was used to contextualize the social network findings. Often, agencies saw
crises through to resolution. However, providers also limited the types of people they served,
leaving many people in crisis in limbo. This study illustrates how attributes of individuals with
mental illness, service providers and their interactions, and state and federal policies intersect to
shape the trajectories of individuals during psychiatric crises. Understanding both the structures of
current local systems and their contexts may support continued evolution toward a more humane
and robust safety net for some of our society’s most vulnerable members.
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For some people with severe mental illness, periodic episodes of escalating symptoms
posing risks of harm to self or others may not be fully preventable. Thus, an essential
component of the mental health system is the capacity to care for people in psychiatric
crisis. Communities around the US struggle to help people experiencing crises re-stabilize in
the least restrictive environments possible. In keeping with this goal, use of state psychiatric
hospitals has dramatically decreased over the last fifty years [1]. However, local resources
have not increased accordingly, often leaving incomplete and fragile networks of services
[2].
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Recently, public mental health systems have shown increasing signs of strain. Demand for
psychiatric hospital beds has been increasing even as the number of beds has continued to
decrease [3]. Individuals in crisis have been detained in hospital emergency departments for
days or even weeks because of a lack of available psychiatric beds [4,5]. Other people who
cause public disturbances are jailed, many to be released and then jailed again when they
have another crisis [6].
Prior research has examined broad-based local public mental health systems as inter-
organizational networks [7–11], as well as factors affecting psychiatric admission versus
discharge from hospital emergency departments [12–14]. However, to our knowledge, no
prior research has examined what happens to people whose psychiatric crises manifest in a
variety of local contexts, and why. To address this gap, the current study focused
specifically on one large county’s network of public psychiatric crisis response services.
Identifying, treating, and releasing people from psychiatric crisis care all present
organizations with high levels of uncertainty and risk [15]. This is largely due to the nature
of severe mental illness. Assessing the threat these individuals pose to self or others entails
sifting through ambiguous signals, often obscured by substance use. Treating identified
crises remains fraught with uncertainty because of reliance on individuals whose behaviors
are often unpredictable. Determining that a crisis has ended is also uncertain, and making
such a decision prematurely can result in death.
Another source of uncertainty for crisis responders is their interdependence with other
agencies. In the short term, crisis services are characterized by sequential interdependence,
whereby outputs from one stage (e.g., a police intervention) become inputs to another stage
(e.g., the hospital emergency department) [16,17]. How one stage is managed can thus
directly affect the success of the next. For instance, the way police interact with people in
crisis can determine whether those individuals go to a therapeutic environment or to jail.
Over the longer term, crisis services are characterized by reciprocal interdependence as
many people with severe mental illness cycle repeatedly through the system [17]. Hence,
over time apparently separate parts of the system affect each other. This is a particularly
challenging context for coordination both because of the risks attendant to short-term
referrals and because other parts of the system affect future demands each given agency will
later face.
Prior organizational theory prescribes that situations of reciprocal interdependence are best
addressed through mutual adjustment because “Standardized response rules are inadequate”
[17, p. 73]. However, laws and regulations governing crisis response may impose such
standardization. For instance, state mental health authority contracts often specify which
local agencies oversee public mental health services and how. In addition, US federal
regulations prohibit hospital emergency departments from discharging people to less
intensive services until they have been medically stabilized [18], and other laws outline
conditions permitting involuntary commitment to psychiatric care [19]. Crisis response
networks may thus be more analogous to legal systems than to some other forms of health
care organizational cooperation [16].
Our interest in the current study was in how agencies responded to people in psychiatric
crisis and how individual, agency, inter-agency, and local and state policy contexts factors
affected these responses. Focusing on a single predominantly urban county in the
Southeastern United States, we therefore sought to address the following questions: (1)
What is the profile of people identified at immediate risk of psychiatric hospitalization by
members of the crisis response network? (2) How do agencies respond to these individuals?
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And (3) What factors shape how these crises are addressed within an increasingly strained
public mental health system?
Methods
Design
The lack of prior research on inter-agency behavior in crisis response networks led us to use
a case study approach [20] to elicit both shared and divergent understandings of crisis
response decisions. Quantitative data were used to characterize the population of people
encountered in psychiatric crisis and the patterns of referrals between crisis responders.
Interviews with agency representatives were used to understand how the attributes of
individuals intersected with agency capacity and inter-agency referral practices, and how
public mental health funding and regulations affected these dynamics.
Participating Agencies
This study focused on the core set of agencies in the Bloomfield County (pseudonym) public
mental health crisis response network. We bounded this network to include agencies
providing services to at least six individuals per month who were at immediate risk of
psychiatric hospitalization, whether or not they were actually hospitalized. Bloomfield is a
large, predominantly urban county with significant numbers of residents who are African
American (over 33%) and Latino (over 10%); diverse health and human services, including
a major university and Veterans Affairs health services center; and a poverty rate
approaching 20%, comparable to that of the state as a whole [21]. The mix of health and
human service agencies and social-economically diverse population are characteristic of
many US mid-sized urban and exurban areas.
The initial sampling frame was developed in consultation with individuals familiar with
Bloomfield’s mental health system. During interviews, study participants also confirmed
that the list of agencies represented all key crisis responders for the county. The final list
was comprised of ten agencies, most of which are referred to here by pseudonyms. The
Mental Health Crisis Facility was operated by a non-profit agency through a contract with
the state’s mental health authority. As the portal of entry into the county’s public behavioral
health system, the Crisis Facility took initial calls from agencies and individuals about
psychiatric crises and either provided treatment at their clinic or, when unable to manage the
presenting problems, referred to other providers. The state also contracted with the same
agency to provide a mobile crisis team for the county.
Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital served the region including Bloomfield County, providing
both short- and long-stay treatment for patients whose needs could not be met by community
agencies. University Hospital was part of an academic medical center serving the area.
Because people could be referred from University Hospital’s emergency department to
either its own inpatient psychiatric unit or alternative facilities, we conducted separate
interviews addressing the hospital’s emergency department and inpatient psychiatric unit,
respectively.
Community Hospital was a general hospital affiliated with University Hospital that had both
a psychiatric emergency department and an inpatient psychiatric unit. At Community
Hospital, we were only able to interview a representative of the inpatient psychiatric unit;
however, other agencies were asked separately about referrals to and from this hospital’s
inpatient unit and emergency department. The fourth hospital-based facility in the study was
a Veterans Affairs (VA) Emergency Psychiatric Program, which provided psychiatric
evaluations and short-term outpatient services. This unit worked closely with the VA’s
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outpatient primary care and mental health clinics. The Bloomfield VA also served as a
regional facility for a number of other counties in the state.
Two local service providers were each chosen to represent a different class of agencies
peripheral to the crisis response system that nonetheless frequently encountered people in
psychiatric crisis. Family Services, a large provider of mental health therapy and psychiatric
services in Bloomfield, was included to represent outpatient providers. Christian Services
was chosen as a major provider of services for people currently or at risk of being homeless.
The final two entities included were the Police Department and County Jail. The police had
responsibility for the central city and the sheriff’s department patrolled areas outside the city
limit and operated the county jail. Although we were unable to interview anyone at the
Bloomfield Sheriff’s Department, we did interview a representative of the county jail. Other
agencies’ reports of referrals from the Sheriff’s Department and Community Hospital’s
emergency department were reflected back onto these two agencies, thus allowing us to
keep them in the network analysis.
Three other agencies were initially considered for inclusion in the crisis response network,
but when contacted reported encountering fewer than six people per month at immediate risk
of psychiatric hospitalization, and were therefore excluded: a psychosocial rehabilitation
facility; a transitional living facility for people with mental health and substance use-related
disorders; and a community health center.
Interview Process
A semi-structured interview protocol built on prior social network analyses [22] and also
incorporated new items developed by the study team to elicit information about factors
found in prior research to affect people in psychiatric crisis [23–25]. The principal
investigator and lead interviewer pre-tested and refined the protocol through cognitive
interviews with three individuals engaged in crisis response in a nearby county [26]. The
resulting protocol included prompts ensuring that the respondent was able to answer any
given question (e.g., ‘Do you have a sense of how many people in psychiatric crisis your
[agency or identified subunit] encounters?’ [if not:] ‘Could you suggest who might be able
to provide that estimate?’) and validating mutual understanding of each question (e.g., ‘So,
about [repeat] number of people per week in such a crisis?’).
Pairs of study team members conducted face-to-face interviews with a total of 13 individuals
at the nine participating agencies between July and December 2010. The lead interviewer
had a master’s degree in public health and prior experience in behavioral health qualitative
research. The principal investigator had substantial prior experience in qualitative and
behavioral health care research. In addition to the cognitive interviews, the lead interviewer
and principal investigator also conducted the first three interviews in the study sample
together. In subsequent interviews, the lead interviewer was accompanied by a research
analyst with a bachelor’s degree in health policy after that individual had reviewed initial
interview transcripts and participated in research team review of those interviews.
At each agency, we asked to speak to whoever could best describe (1) the agency’s role in
psychiatric crisis response in general, (2) how the agency had responded to ten individuals
recently at immediate risk of psychiatric hospitalization, and why they responded the way
they had to each person, and (3) aggregate patterns of crisis referrals to and from each other
member of Bloomfield’s crisis network. At some agencies, one person was able to address
all three questions. At others, up to three individuals addressed different questions. Prior to
interviews, study participants were mailed a worksheet to note requested information about
each (de-identified) individual encountered in their sample of ten and a separate worksheet
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estimating aggregate referrals to and from other agencies. During the interview, a member of
the study team reviewed the worksheets with the participant(s), first reviewing information
about each individual recently seen and then ensuring that the participant had understood
each item about aggregate referrals to and from each other organization or key subunit
(emergency department or inpatient unit) within the crisis response network. The mean
interview time was 66 minutes, with a range of 40 minutes to two hours. The Institutional
Review Board at the lead author’s institution approved procedures for data collection and
reporting.
Measures
Agency respondents were asked to record the following items for each person on their list of
ten recently encountered individuals: basic demographics (age and sex), psychiatric and
psychosocial factors (diagnosis, risk of harm to self or others, whether homeless, prior
hospitalizations), whether the agency provided any therapeutic services to that person during
the crisis, if and where the agency referred the person during the crisis, and the length of
delay if any when a transfer did occur.
Each respondent was then asked to indicate whether their agency sent and/or received
referrals of people in crisis from each other agency in Bloomfield’s crisis response network.
For those agencies with which they exchanged any referrals, each representative was asked
to choose among the following options to indicate the approximate numbers of individuals
per month sent and received, respectively: 1 for fewer than 4; 2 for “about 1–4”; 3 for
“about 5–10”; and 4 for “more than 10.” This strategy was based on prior experience
indicating that ordinal counts were reported more reliably than absolute numbers [cites
omitted for peer review]. These were the best estimates available for most study participants.
However, Eastern Hospital was able to provide more accurate admission waitlist data
instead.
Analysis
The samples of people in crisis were combined across participating agencies in an Excel
spreadsheet and summary descriptive statistics were calculated. The jail representative did
not have information about individuals recently seen, and so provided estimates. Those
numbers were omitted from final statistics, although a comparison including those estimates
had yielded generally similar results. Study participants were often not certain of
individuals’ housing status. Despite the resulting imprecision and likely underestimation, we
retained this variable because of the importance of housing stability [27]. Because the
network instrument eliciting aggregate patterns of referrals to and from other crisis
responders used ordinal estimates rather than exact numbers, a rank order was used to
indicate the relative magnitudes of referrals between agencies in the crisis response network.
All interviews were professionally transcribed and reviewed by one of the interviewers for
accuracy. The lead author also read every transcript to become familiar with the interview
content. Based on prior research on factors affecting psychiatric crisis disposition and pilot
work for this study, the lead author developed a start list of codes [28]. Using Atlas.ti
software, one member of the team [XX] applied these initial codes to all interview
transcripts. Reviewing all coded text segments, these two members of the team [YY and
XX] refined the codes to better reflect the nature of participants’ comments in the current set
of interviews. In addition, they added new codes to address emerging themes, such as
perceptions within the network of the most central agencies and the ability of front line staff
at non-mental health agencies to recognize mental health crises. Again, both authors
reviewed the coded text segments, discussing any differences until they reached agreement.
The lead author [YY] then drafted a report, initially including the text segments across all
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interviews viewed as supporting each conclusion. The entire study team reviewed these
provisional conclusions, assessing each for its grounding in these text segments. The lead
author revised interpretations based on group discussion, as well as minor feedback from
one of the study participants on the initial report distributed to all agencies.
Pajek social network analysis software was used to generate the social network diagram
shown in Figure 1 [29]. Each organization’s ties were measured through that entity’s
reported number of crisis referrals received from each other network member, with the
exception of the Sheriff’s Department and Community Hospital’s emergency department,
for which other participants’ reports served as the best available estimates.
Results
Psychiatric Crises and Dispositions
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the samples of people identified by participating
agencies as recently at imminent risk of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, pooled across
agencies (N= 94, 9–13 per reporting agency or subunit). Study participants reported seeing
mostly (90%) adults under 65 years of age. The very low number of children (3%) may
reflect the extent to which parents and schools serve as first responders for pediatric
psychiatric crises; parents of children with mental illness in this county have also reported to
us in the context of a related study that they use a nearby county’s health system because it
has better pediatric psychiatric resources. Overall, 77% of the individuals were categorized
by crisis responders as presenting risk of harm to self or others; the other 23% sometimes
reflected staff determinations that initial threats had been overestimated or had diminished.
The majority had high levels of psychiatric severity and persistent illness, frequently
compounded by homelessness. As the homeless shelter representative put it: “‘Man, I’ve
been going to hospitals since I was a kid.’ That’s like the standard phrase.”) The single
largest category of referrals was by self, friends, or family.
On average, agencies reported providing medication management to 47% of the individuals
they encountered in crisis, and psychotherapy to 35% (Table 1). Variations reflected both
individuals’ needs and agency capacity, with therapeutic services often being limited (e.g.,
in the hospital ED and jail) or nonexistent (for the police and homeless shelter). Almost half
(46%) of the time, agencies reported keeping individuals through crisis resolution, although
even in these instances the agency reporting on a given individual was not necessarily the
first to encounter that person during the crisis. About as frequently (47% of the time),
agencies referred individuals to other service providers, most often (40% of all individuals)
to an inpatient facility. One common reason for referring people was lack of beds in the
respondent’s agency (12% of all individuals); however, the most common reason was that
the individual was deemed violent or suicidal (23%). Limited private space and therapeutic
services often made rapid referrals important. However, when agencies did refer individuals
in crisis, only 32% occurred without delay.
Crisis Response Network Structure
Table 2 and Figure 1 illustrate the highly interdependent nature of Bloomfield crisis
response. On average, key psychiatric crisis responders received referrals of Bloomfield
residents in crisis from four other members of the crisis response network. Eastern State
Psychiatric Hospital and Community Hospital’s inpatient psychiatric unit received referrals
from the greatest number of other agencies (9 each), followed closely by the Mental Health
Crisis Facility (8) and the VA (7). The three entities that received the most people in crisis
were Community Hospital’s inpatient psychiatric unit, the Mental Health Crisis Facility, and
Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital.
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Both social network data shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 and interviews revealed Eastern
State Psychiatric Hospital as a critical back-up facility for people who required intensive
services not available locally. The highest proportion of referrals from Bloomfield County to
Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital was from University Hospital’s emergency department,
followed by the Mental Health Crisis Facility. Once an individual in crisis was admitted,
Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital generally kept that person through crisis resolution.
Adaptive Response to Individuals’ Needs
Social network and interview data suggest that Bloomfield agencies were largely successful
in addressing people’s needs or referring individuals to other entities. As intended by the
state mental health authority, the Mental Health Crisis Facility served as a local network
hub. The Crisis Facility’s internal utilization data indicated well over 100 evaluations each
month at their walk-in clinic, and short term stabilization for the majority at their site.
During evaluation, Crisis Facility staff often determined that alternatives to hospitalization
such as medication management, stabilization at their site, and/or referrals to community
providers could meet individuals’ needs. Evidence of their success included Christian
Services’ perception that they did “a very diligent job of trying to intervene with these folks
so that they’re getting the appropriate level of service and they’re not utilizing the
shelter….”
For veterans and their dependents, the VA Emergency Psychiatric Program bridged between
acute and routine mental health care. Members of this team referred patients to clinics, and a
nurse practitioner could follow up on medications prescribed during emergency department
visits. VA clinic crisis management services could also support people who had long wait
times for appointments in the general VA outpatient clinic. The program director reported
that this team connected many newly returning combat veterans to community care.
The Police Department had also developed ways to meet the needs of the people they
encountered who were in psychiatric crisis, including Crisis Intervention Team training.
Police officers often worked with a judge who held court within the jail to divert people in
psychiatric crises directly into mental health treatment, which could sometimes entail re-
connecting with existing outpatient providers. For people jailed during psychiatric crises, jail
social workers helped prepare for post-release transitions to community services. The
primary focus while people were in jail was on limited crisis-focused medication
management.
Signs of System Strain
Despite Bloomfield’s abundance of high intensity services, people in crisis often did not
enter therapeutic environments quickly if at all. For instance, some participants reported that
police tended to default to University Hospital’s ED or a homeless shelter instead of the
system’s intended portal of entry, the Mental Health Crisis Facility. Possible reasons cited
were police inability to identify the psychiatric nature of some crises and individuals who
did not initially communicate their symptoms clearly. The Christian Services homeless
shelter’s representative also believed that one reason police took people in crisis to the
shelter instead of the Crisis Facility was because “it takes a whole lot of paperwork to
[initiate mental health treatment].”
Once crises were identified, when referrals were necessary the majority were delayed.
Although these delays were often under two hours, the average was about a day and the
maximum reported was six days. Interviews suggested that local inpatient providers and
Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital all struggled to meet the demands they faced from people
in crisis. The most common recipient of crisis referrals in this county of over 200,000
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residents, Community Hospital’s psychiatric unit, had fewer than 30 beds. The VA served
only veterans and their families. University Hospital’s ED had a pattern of crisis referrals
virtually identical to that of the Mental Health Crisis Facility, but felt ill-equipped for this
role.
In this constrained context, interviews suggested that risk – especially that posed by violent
patients - often affected agency response. Some study participants saw the Mental Health
Crisis Facility as avoiding individuals who posed even relatively low risk. One agency
representative reported that the Facility’s mobile crisis team “will not come out if a person is
making threats … period.” A participant reported that the Crisis Facility sent people to his
hospital because of violence that was sometimes overstated. Acknowledging that the
hospital had a larger staff and police, their representative nonetheless complained of the
Crisis Facility: “They will say ‘We just have two little old ladies working. There’s a big,
burly guy. He wants to knock things down.’ I’ll say, ‘We just have two nurses there too.’”
In the eyes of many community agency respondents, Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital’s
role was to manage severe psychiatric problems and violence exceeding Bloomfield
agencies’ coping capacities. The flip side of this was that Eastern had the particularly
resource-intensive role of caring for these individuals through stabilization. Fulfilling this
role for a multi-county region created a backlog on Eastern’s waitlists that often left
Bloomfield agencies without a place to send people they could not handle themselves due to
space and staffing constraints. In an attempt to reduce referrals into Eastern, the state mental
health authority generally required providers to secure prior refusals from other hospitals
before a patient would be eligible for admission. Due to demand overload on local hospital
inpatient psychiatric units statewide, interviews suggested that this process in some
instances became a formality.
To a large degree, Bloomfield’s crisis responders sought to reduce their uncertainty by
limiting their domains in terms of conditions addressed, populations served, and/or services
provided [30]. Sometimes these limits were clear cut. For instance, Community Hospital did
not address substance abuse or treat children. In addition, providers within Bloomfield
County sought to avoid people who were violent, a risk factor whose boundaries appeared to
be amorphous. As one hospital representative put it, “…[the patients] throw a chair, and the
Mental Health Crisis Facility will send them to us… but that’s not a real reason to be
sending someone here.” Although prior studies have found individuals’ violence to increase
their likelihood of psychiatric hospitalization [31,32], we believe this is the first to probe
how providers’ avoidance of individuals presenting these and other challenges affected a
local crisis response system.
Restricting the types of people and conditions addressed may have been a rational strategy
for individual agencies. However, the cumulative result for the system was one of
reverberating rationing of crisis services that likely contributed to the high rate of delayed
transfers. Rationing is generally a prioritization mechanism of last resort, employed after
agencies’ more proactive attempts to predict, smooth, or buffer themselves from
unpredictable demand have failed [17]. One hospital received approximately 300 referrals in
a month, and declined over 200 of them.
In Bloomfield, rationing affected both the ability to address needs during a given crisis and
longer term interdependence, as many individuals periodically re-entered crisis services. In
conversations with the study team for a related project, Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital
clinical leadership noted frequent inability to discharge patients for long periods after they
had stabilized and might have been better off in the community. This happened particularly
with geriatric patients, non-US citizens, and individuals who frequently cycled through the
Wells et al. Page 8













crisis service system and had often “burned bridges” with previously available housing
options. Once individuals with severe mental illness were back in community settings, the
outpatient mental health provider in the study reported struggling to prevent or de-escalate
crises. Reflecting on increasingly restrictive Medicaid service definitions, a Family Services
therapist observed, “You go there [the patient’s home], you find a different situation, a
different environment. So you have to change the dynamics. What am I going to do with this
person? What do I do to keep this person out of the hospital today? It’s like a constant
headache that we have to deal with every day, and with limited time to do it. Before you had
all the time to talk to them and find out what’s going on. Now you don’t have that much
time to do it.”
Recourse among Bloomfield crisis responders to the ‘unhappy solution’ of rationing [17] fits
prior findings that conflict has particularly damaging effects on inter-organizational
coordination in legally circumscribed contexts [16]. In Bloomfield, both state and federal
policies shaped the psychiatric crisis system. Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital was staffed
to handle even the most psychiatrically severe and violent patients, but had been
substantially downsized by the state. The result of this rule-oriented system was
coordination that worked for what might be characterized as ‘routine’ crises, but often broke
down when individuals in crisis violated agency norms of acceptable uncertainty and risk,
especially in relation to violence [15].
Discussion
Findings from the current study suggest that state and federal policies may in some respects
foster rationing in local psychiatric crisis response. Organizational theory and empirical
research suggest that clarifying organizational responsibility is especially important in
difficult task environments [17,33]. In keeping with this prediction, Provan and Milward [9]
found the best public mental health systems outcomes in a city whose coordinating agency
was much more influential than the inpatient facility. In Bloomfield, the state mental health
authority contracted with one entity for system coordination – the Mental Health Crisis
Facility – but because of federal regulations ultimate responsibility for the highest risk
individuals lay primarily with hospitals [18]. Despite their officially distinct network roles
and the hospital’s preference for such distinctions, the patterns of referrals into the Mental
Health Crisis Facility and one hospital’s emergency department were virtually identical.
This disconnect between funding and responsibility created enduring conflicts within
Bloomfield’s crisis response system [16], often played out in delays affecting people in
crisis.
Local, state, and federal factors also interacted to constrain crisis response options. For
instance, regulations prohibiting coverage of state psychiatric hospital care for 22–64 year
olds through Medicaid and limited community services leave states absorbing all costs of
care for adult patients in the state psychiatric hospitals. Allowing Medicaid coverage of state
hospital care could encourage states to invest more in their capacity and thus alleviate strain
within Bloomfield [34]. Local and state investment in other health and human services could
also ease the strain on Bloomfield County’s crisis service system both by helping people
return to community settings as quickly as possible after crisis resolution, thereby freeing
inpatient capacity as well as reducing the rate of additional crises. Access to medication
management, outpatient therapy, and other supportive services can also help avoid and
reduce subsequent crises.
When crises cannot be averted, improving the information available to first responders may
reduce the uncertainty they face. The high proportion of people in this study who self-
referred into crisis services suggests that friends and family members could provide insights
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into what underlie a given situation and which response options are viable. In other field
work, families of individuals in Bloomfield with mental illness have mentioned a need for
such training among medical personnel as well as other first responders.
This study revealed distinctive dynamics of a crisis response network within a broader
public mental health system. Even among health and human services, psychiatric crisis
response is characterized by exceptionally high uncertainty and risk, as well as both short-
term sequential and longer term reciprocal interdependence. In such contexts, findings from
this study suggest that externally imposed regulatory constraints may tip a local system into
a pattern of rationing, especially when staff encounter individuals whose behaviors violate
their norms of acceptable behavior [15,17]. Such tactics, while rational for each agency in
the short term, can make it more difficult for all system participants to both prevent and
address crises. To the extent to which state and federal policies shape the structure of local
crisis services, they may improve system responsiveness by aligning resources and
responsibilities in ways that buffer agencies from uncertainty.
Cumulatively, this study shows that even in a county with four hospitals and extensive
referral relationships, capacity constraints frequently leave people in psychiatric crisis in
limbo. For instance, the Mental Health Crisis Facility successfully manages many
psychiatric crises, and believes that local hospitals has capacity they lack to manage violent
as well as medically complicated patients. At the same time, hospital representatives believe
they are not equipped to handle violence either. Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital is
equipped to treat violent patients, and yet faces demand that far exceeds its capacity – in part
because it often cannot discharge patients who would be better served by community
agencies. All of these local dynamics are affected by state and national health policies,
including continuing efforts to contain public health care and public housing costs [35], that
have weakened links in the already fragile chains of reciprocal interdependence.
This study had several limitations. Most notably, generality will be unknown until findings
are replicated in other communities [20]. Although participants did refer to records to
provide profiles and dispositions of a subset of recently encountered individuals, most
agencies provided only rough estimates of the numbers of people in psychiatric crisis
referred to and from other agencies. Participants in some instances noted respects in which
their samples of individuals recently seen in crisis were not representative of the population
they encountered overall (e.g., including a disproportionately high number of male and
young patients, or low number of people who were homeless). Hence, the study results
should be construed as illustrative of local crisis response dynamics at one point in time
rather than definitive even with respect to this county.
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that Bloomfield’s results are not unique. Nationally, a
growing shortage of psychiatric beds is straining local community crisis response capacities
[4,5]. One recent study in the Boston area found a mean emergency department length of
stay for psychiatric patients of 11.5 hours, virtually identical to the 10.9 hour transfer delay
found in the current study’s ED. The same Boston study also found some especially
vulnerable subgroups, such as older patients, the uninsured, substance users, and those who
become agitated, experiencing disproportionate delays [36]. Communities are struggling to
meet the needs of persons with mental illness largely with outpatient and other community-
based services [1,2]. Critical to the success of these efforts is a coordinated network of
service providers linking community services with available hospital-based inpatient care.
Future research aimed at documenting these shortages and their implications for crisis
service capacity and response in multiple communities is needed. Organizational theory
perspectives and methods can serve as a framework for this research.
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In this study, people entering the public mental health system in psychiatric crisis often had
severe and multiple illnesses. Many were homeless. The high proportion who self-referred
or referred by family or friends into crisis services reflects the extent to which even
individuals with severe mental illness manage their own well-being. However, when people
experience psychiatric episodes, the usual vulnerability attendant to any health crisis is often
compounded by disorientation, and sometimes by a degree of agitation that can greatly
complicate efforts to provide help.
Crisis response services are an essential part of behavioral health care, assisting individuals
and their families during very stressful situations and protecting the public by de-escalating
conditions that otherwise could harm others. These services assure many front-line
responders that, when situations arise that exceed their capacities, there are ways to help
people who need immediate and intensive levels of care. This schematic examination of
Bloomfield’s crisis response network highlights the organizational interdependencies and
tensions that lie at the core of local public mental health systems. Learning how to manage
these interdependencies will be a key challenge for local program managers in the years
ahead.
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Figure 1. Referrals of people in psychiatric crisis within Bloomfield County crisis response
network
This figure is based on each agency’s report of how many people in crisis they received in a
typical month from each other agency. Thicker lines represent higher volumes of referrals.
The dashed lines into Community Hospital ED indicate use of other agencies’ reports of
referrals, given that we did not have a representative of the ED in the study.
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Table 1
Profiles of people in psychiatric crisis (n= 94, 9–13 per reporting unit)
Attribute Percent
Age
 Under 18 years of age 3%
 18–65 years old 90%
 Over 65 years of age 6%
Sex
 Male 57%
Risk of harm to self or others (an assessment that may evolve during a crisis assessment) 77%
 Diagnosis (not mutually exclusive)
 Depression, episodic mood disorder, including bipolar 49%
 Schizophreniform, including psychosis 27%
 Substance abuse-related disorder 32%
 Anxiety/stress/adjustment disorder, including PTSD 15%
 Other, including dementia, mental retardation/developmental delay 12%
 Unknown 11%
 Personality disorder 6%
 More than one diagnosis identified (undoubtedly an underestimate) 40%
Prior hospitalizations (likely understated as unknown to some units) 57%
Homeless (also often unknown to units and hence likely understated) 30%
Referral source (not mutually exclusive)
 Self, friend, family 52%
 Jail, law enforcement, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 13%
 University Hospital Emergency Department 13%
 Bloomfield Mental Health Crisis Facility 8%
 911 calls (as described in interview; not clear whether police or EMS responded) 8%
 University Hospital Psychiatric Ward 2%
 Bloomfield Community Hospital 1%
 Other hospitals 3%
 Group home 3%
 Emergency Medical Services (likely originating in 911 calls, listed above) 2%
 Outpatient provider 2%
 Other 3%
Services provided by participating organization during crisis
 Medication management 47%
 Therapy 35%
Disposition
 Organization kept the individual through crisis 46%
 Referred elsewhere 47%
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Attribute Percent
 Released to home or community 3%
 Individual refused services offered 3%
Disposition of the 53% of individuals not kept by a particular organization through crisis:
 Referred to an inpatient facility 40%
 Referred for outpatient care 6%
 Went to permanent or temporary housing 3%
 Went to jail 2%
 Still waiting for disposition as of interview date 1%
Reasons why 53% of individuals were not kept through crisis period
 Individual was violent/suicidal 23%
 Limited bed capacity 12%
 Longer term care was needed 2%
 Patient preference 4%
 Other 12%
How often transfer to a receiving entity was immediate 32%
Days
Mean delay when participants were able to estimate (n=36) 1
Range of reported delays in transfers when not immediate 6













Wells et al. Page 17
Table 2
Referrals of people in psychiatric crisis
Agency Referrals Received
Number of other agencies/units
sending referrals to this agency
Rank order of number of people referred from
other agencies in this list
Mental Health Crisis Facility 8 2
Eastern State Psychiatric Hospital 9 3
University Hospital Emergency Department 6 5
University Hospital inpatient psychiatric unit 5 4
Community Hospital Emergency Department 3* 7*
Community Hospital inpatient psychiatric unit 9 1 (highest volume)
VA 7 6
Family Services 0 Tied for 10
Christian Services 2 Tied for 8
Police 3 9
Sheriff 0* Tied for 10
Jail 1 Tied for 8
Average 4
*
not interviewed – numbers based on other agencies’ reports of referrals to them
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